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ABSTRACT 1 
Transport user benefits are of great importance in cost benefit analysis when appraising transport projects. 2 
Generally they have the greatest impact on the results of cost-benefit analyses. It is common to adopt the 3 
consumer surplus for calculating transport user benefits. The consumer surplus measure is based on the 4 
underlying demand model and follows from the integration of the demand curve. If the popular logit 5 
model is used for forecasting travel demand, consumer surplus measure takes a closed form (the 6 
“logsum”) that is easy to calculate. Furthermore, in cost-benefit analyses the change in consumer surplus 7 
between an initial and final state is needed, which can be easily derived by the difference of the logsums 8 
of the two states. This logsum approach is proven and correct for travel demand models based on the logit 9 
model without multiple constraints. However, for travel demand models dealing with two or more sets of 10 
constraints the logsum approach fails.  11 
In this paper we describe a mathematical approach for a transport user benefits measure that corresponds 12 
to the consumer surplus and is universal for all travel demand models with constraints. We exemplarily 13 
derive the measure for a doubly constrained trip distribution. The applicability of the derived approach is 14 
shown by a small example.  15 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Transport investments and policies are often associated with high investment costs for society and cost 2 
changes for transport users, which might lead to welfare changes. It is therefore essential to anticipate 3 
welfare impacts ex ante and give decision makers robust decision support. There are different concepts 4 
for evaluating projects and policies; however, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normally the method of 5 
choice. 6 
Generally, in transport project and policy appraisals, transport user benefits have (in addition to 7 
investment costs) the most impact on welfare changes. User benefits result from the changes of user costs 8 
such as travel time and travel cost between the “initial state” (the most likely transport situation over the 9 
course of the appraisal period if no intervention were to occur) and the “final state” (the initial state with 10 
transport intervention). Economic theory – as the theoretical basis of the CBA – provides the concept of 11 
the (change in) consumer surplus for the calculation of the transport user benefits. This measure can be 12 
derived by the mathematical integral of the demand function (see, for example, Varian, 1992). 13 
Accordingly, there is a direct link between user benefits, costs, and travel demand changes. The applied 14 
method of integrating the travel demand function defines the accuracy of the resulting user benefits. The 15 
standard approach in practice is the so called “Rule of a Half” (RoH). It has been widely used in project 16 
investments and policy analysis since its first introduction in the 1960s (Williams, 1977). The concept 17 
assumes a linear path between the user costs in the initial and final state, whereas the real shape of the 18 
underlying demand function is neglected. For this reason, the RoH only provides a precise benefit 19 
measure for small user cost changes and only if the demand curve is nearly a straight line, otherwise it can 20 
be only considered as a rough approximation (De Jong et al. 2007). 21 
Demand curves of travel demand models are generally not straight lines, and the RoH often provides 22 
inexact transport user benefits. However, there are other approaches to obtain more precise results. In 23 
particular, the antiderivative of the applied travel demand function could be used for calculating a 24 
mathematical exact consumer surplus. This approach presupposes that the antiderivative is known. If that 25 
is the case, direct integration is possible and would be the best solution. 26 
The widely used multinomial logit model (MNL) provides the antiderivative that is called “logsum term” 27 
(or short “logsum”). The MNL is based on the concept of random utility maximization and was 28 
microeconomically derived by McFadden (1981). In context of project evaluation, the consumer surplus 29 
of the initial and final states can be provided by logsums. Hence, the change in consumer surplus is 30 
calculated as the logsum difference. 31 
The logsum approach is a theoretically well-founded and easily calculable method for providing transport 32 
user benefits. It is applied by more and more researchers and transportation planners (Zhao et al., 2012). 33 
However, it strongly depends on the use of the MNL (or nested logit) as the underlying travel demand 34 
function. There are many travel demand models applied in research and practice that are not apparently 35 
congruent to the MNL. This is especially the case for travel demand models with constraints. These 36 
models are traditionally used for trip distribution and regard origin and destination constraints, which 37 
ensure that given total numbers of trips produced in and attracted to each traffic zone equal resulting 38 
numbers of trips. If such a model is used for calculating trip distribution, the logsum approach fails and as 39 
a rule transport user benefits are approximated by the RoH. 40 
In this paper we want to transfer the logsum approach for these widely used constrained travel demand 41 
models and provide a mathematical exact transport user benefit measure for these models. For this 42 
purpose an adjustment of the logsum difference is necessary. We will carry out the analysis by the EVA 43 
model (Vrtic et al., 2007) as a representative of constrained models, which is characterized by different 44 
constraint types. For this reason the paper first introduces travel demand models with constraints, in 45 
particular the EVA model and its “logit version”. It then goes on with benefit measures and problems of 46 
the logsum difference approach with constraint models. After that, the mathematical adjustment of the 47 
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logsum approach follows. Then, a short and very simple example will serve as an illustration of the 1 
approach. Finally, a summery is provided. It has to be noted that the main aim of the paper is to provide a 2 
theoretical derivation of an adjusted logsum approach for travel demand models with constraints rather 3 
than to show specific applications and comparisons. These questions will be discussed in the future. 4 
TRAVEL DEMAND MODELS WITH CONSTRAINTS 5 
There are lots of different concepts and approaches for modelling travel demand, and the well-known 4-6 
step-algorithm is of particular importance. These steps can be calculated successively or partly combined, 7 
whereby a combination of trip distribution and mode choice is most common. Here we focus on this 8 
approach and give models with constraints special attention. 9 
Traditionally, constraints are used for trip distribution. The best-known model is the doubly constrained 10 
gravity model (see Wilson, 1967), which satisfies the given total numbers of trips originating in and 11 
attracted to a travel zone. The total numbers of trips are results of trip generation and input variables of 12 
trip distribution. 13 
EVA Model 14 
Lohse et al. (1997) extended the doubly constrained gravity model to mode choice and to less restrictive 15 
kinds of constraints. The model is called EVA model from the German terms for production (Erzeugung), 16 
distribution (Verteilung) and mode choice (Aufteilung). It is more universal and flexible than traditional 17 
approaches, which can also be formulated by the EVA approach. The algorithm contains trip generation, 18 
joint trip distribution, and mode choice. However, in the following we do not consider trip generation and 19 
mode choice, since it has no influence of the topic discussed in this paper. For a more comprehensive 20 
discussion of the EVA model see Vrtic et al. (2007). 21 
The EVA approach models travel behavior based on a detailed segmentation of behaviorally homogenous 22 
groups of persons, their activities and so forth. For the sake of clarity, we omit differentiation, but all 23 
following analyses will be applicable to all groups. The main focus here is on constraints, and the EVA 24 
model distinguishes inelastic (or hard) and elastic (or soft) constraints. Inelastic constraints are used if the 25 
total number of trips of an alternative (origin or destination) can be derived exclusively from zone 26 
characteristics, i.e. transport supply and subsequent competition between zones do not have any effect on 27 
trip production. In contrast, elastic constraints are used if transport supply and zone competition have an 28 
additional influence. 29 
Since it is not possible to show all facets, in the following the model specification with a set of inelastic 30 
constraints for the origins and a set of elastic constraints for the destinations will be used. The doubly 31 
constrained model is then: 32 
( ) pij ij i j j
ij i
j
max
ij j j
i
T = f g a b d
T = O
constraints
T = D D



≤ 

∑
∑
   (1) 33 
with 34 
ai, bj balancing factors to satisfy the constraints 35 
f deterrence function with regard to the generalized costs gijk from zone i to zone j by mode k 36 
Oi total number of trips originating at zone i 37 
Dj total number of trips attracted to zone j 38 
Djmax maximal total number of trips attracted to zone j 39 
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Tij trips from zone i to zone j 1 
djp destination specific attractor/potential 2 
Thereby the trips Tij are calculated taking into account generalized costs, destination specific attractors 3 
and the two sets of constraints. The constraints are satisfied by the balancing factors, which are solved 4 
iteratively. For solving this optimization problem different methods can be used, for example, the Furness 5 
algorithm (Furness, 1965). The given Ois are an inelastic set of constraints and are calculated in the trip 6 
generation a priori. The same applies to Djmax, which, however, define only upper limits of what zones j 7 
can accommodate. The resulting Djs are calculated within the trip distribution under consideration of 8 
Djmax and the spatial competition of destination zones. This competition is reflected by different 9 
generalized costs and destination specific attractors, which could be, for instance, population in zones or 10 
Djmax. 11 
There are different combinations of constraints that are possible and reasonable. For example, imposing 12 
inelastic constraints for work or school trips are necessary, because we expect to find workers or students 13 
at their places of work and education respectively. Elastic constraints are used for substitutable trips such 14 
as for leisure or shopping. 15 
In addition to constraints, the above-mentioned deterrence function has a high importance for modelling 16 
results. The EVA model is of high flexibility and nearly every function type can be used. Probably the 17 
exponential function is the most important function and will be applied below. In addition to generalized 18 
costs, origin and destination specific characteristics can be considered. In equation (1), djP represents such 19 
a variable. Considering zone specific values would only have an impact on modelling results in the case 20 
of elastic, but not inelastic constraints. The reason is that inelastic constraints are not influenced by zone 21 
competition and the resulting total numbers of trips per zone are guaranteed by modifying the balancing 22 
factors. 23 
Travel demand models are used for estimating demand changes due to transport interventions. For this 24 
reason, forecasting capability is of great relevance. An important question is how constraints should be 25 
handled. There are different approaches to answering this question. If information about the (maximal) 26 
number of trips in each zone is known for the final state, the same procedure as in the initial state should 27 
be executed. If information is not available or valid, balancing factors defined in the initial state could be 28 
used. From this it follows that the total number of trips per zone are not restricted by constraints. However, 29 
the most common approach is that origin and destination constraints are given and new balancing factors 30 
are calculated. 31 
EVA Logit Model 32 
For detailed economic analyses and welfare evaluation, it is reasonable and possible to formulate the 33 
EVA model in terms of an MNL. Other authors, such as Anas (1983) and Erlander and Stewart (1990), 34 
have already shown how a constrained travel demand model may be defined as an MNL. However, they 35 
demonstrated it for doubly constrained gravity models which exclusively consider inelastic constraints. 36 
Here we apply the approach for the EVA model with different sets of constraints. 37 
Starting point is the well-known MNL. This model is grounded on the economic concept of random 38 
utility maximization (RUM) and the individuals are assumed to choose the most beneficial (optimal) 39 
alternative (McFadden, 1981). Unlike the constrained models, the MNL respects per se a maximum of 40 
one set of constraints (singly constrained model) and calculates probabilities for the discrete alternatives 41 
and not the trips directly. These are definable by multiplying the probabilities with the total number of 42 
trips (total demand). 43 
The comparison of alternatives is on the basis of the alternative specific utilities. Therefore utility 44 
functions including decision-relevant variables have to be defined. In addition, the utility is decomposed 45 
into an observed and an unobserved (random) component. The reason is that not all decision-relevant 46 
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factors are observable for researchers. The utility that a single decision maker or representative of a 1 
homogenous group obtains from alternative ij can be described by (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 2 
ij ij ijU = V + ε i, j∀    (2) 3 
with 4 
U utility of an alternative 5 
V observable part of utility (indirect utility) 6 
ε unobservable part of utility 7 
In a standard MNL the unobserved utility is assumed to have i.i.d. extreme value distribution with 8 
standard variance (Π²/6). Then the choice probabilities Pij are given by: 9 
ij
i'j'
V
ij V
i' j'
eP =
e∑∑
   (3) 10 
It represents the demand for a representative person. Trips Tij result from a globally fixed MNL: 11 
ij ijT = P T    (4) 12 
with 13 
T total number of trips over all zones (total demand) 14 
For defining the EVA MNL, the observable part of utility is the central element. Again, we show the case 15 
with inelastic origin and elastic destination constraints, but other cases can be easily defined as well. 16 
Firstly, the utility function is defined by the observable alternative specific attributes (negative) 17 
generalized costs and destination utilities. In addition we include origin and destination shadow prices 18 
(Neuburger and Wilcox, 1976). The term “shadow” is used, since these “prices” are not definable a priori 19 
but derivable from the balancing factors of the EVA model a posteriori (after the iteration process). The 20 
given numbers of originating and attracting trips contain additional information about the underlying 21 
decision process of transport users. This information is implemented in the utility function by the shadow 22 
prices, which serve the emendation of the “a priori utility”. Then, by means of the shadow prices, the 23 
utility maximization process provides the probabilities of alternatives producing a result with satisfied 24 
constraints. The utility function can then be written: 25 
ij ij j i jV = -g + z +θ + τ i, j∀    (5) 26 
with 27 
θi, τj shadow prices of origin i and destination j 28 
zj observable destination utility 29 
By implementing this utility function in the MNL we get the EVA MNL for estimating trips Tij: 30 
( )
( )
ij j i j
i'j' j' i' j'
-g +z +θ +τ
ij ij -g +z +θ +τ
i' j'
ij i
j
max
ij j j
i
eT = P T = T
e
T = O
T = D D≤
∑∑
∑
∑
   (6) 31 
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The EVA MNL is in fact a doubly constrained MNL and defined by this equation, although shadow 1 
prices are unknown. However, it can be shown that shadow prices are easily derivable from the EVA 2 
model by mathematical redrafts as follows (Winkler, 2015): 3 
( )
( )
i
j
θ
i i i
τ
j j j
a = e ln a = θ
b = e ln b = τ
→
→
   (7) 4 
Hence, the derivation of the shadow prices is straightforward by logarithmic transformations of the 5 
balancing factors. The same applies to destination utilities that are defined by logarithmic transformation 6 
of the destination attractors. 7 
LOGSUM DIFFERENCE AND ITS FAILURE IN CASE OF CONSTRAINED MODELS 8 
Measuring transport user benefits is often necessary for evaluation transport investments and policies by 9 
CBA. For this purpose the concept of change in consumer surplus is often used. When applying an MNL 10 
for estimating change in travel demand, change in consumer surplus can be easily derived by the logsum 11 
difference. It is a simple mathematical formula and consistent with microeconomics. The logsum 12 
difference as a measure for change in consumer surplus has been investigated and used in transport for 13 
some time (see, for a comprehensive literature synthesis, Ma et al., 2015). 14 
For deriving the change in consumer surplus on the base of MNL, expected maximum utility of a decision 15 
maker or representative has to be defined and it is: 16 
( ) ( )( )
ij
ij
V
i j
E U E Max U , i, j
= ln e + C
= ∀
 
 
 
∑∑
   (8) 17 
where C is an unknown constant that represents that the absolute level of utility is not measurable. This 18 
mathematical expression corresponds with the antiderivative of the MNL (see, for example, Small and 19 
Rosen, 1981). The argument in parentheses is the denominator of the MNL and the term 20 
( )ij
i j
ln exp V∑∑  is called “logsum”, which is simply the log of the denominator. However, for 21 
evaluating transport investments and policies we are more interested in change in utility that is defined by 22 
the difference between initial (0) and final (1) state conditions. For this purpose a difference in logsum 23 
terms is applied: 24 
( )
1 0
ij ijV V
i j i j
E U = ln e - ln e
   
∆    
   
∑∑ ∑∑    (9) 25 
The unknown constant C enters expected maximum utility both before and after change and drops out. On 26 
the basis of this change in expected maximum utility, the required change in consumer surplus can be 27 
derived, which is the monetized equivalent. Hence we get the change in consumer surplus by normalizing 28 
the logsum difference by the marginal utility of income λ (of a representative traveler of a homogenous 29 
group): 30 
( )
1 0
ij ijV V
i j i j
1E CS = ln e - ln e
λ
    
∆     
     
∑∑ ∑∑    (10) 31 
This normalization presumes that λ is constant and income effect is not accounted for (see, for example, 32 
Williams, 1977 and Small and Rosen, 1981). This assumption is reasonable for many problems. However, 33 
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if income effects occur, different and more complex approaches for deriving monetary user benefits have 1 
to be used. Microeconomics applies the “compensating variation” (CV) as the Hicksian (or compensated) 2 
version of consumer surplus (see, for example, Varian, 1992). There has been extensive research for 3 
deriving CV for discrete choice models, see, for example, McFadden, 1995, Karlström and Morey, 2001 4 
and Dagsvik and Karlström, 2005, but this is not the topic here. 5 
In the present analysis we suppose a constant marginal utility of income, which, however, has to be 6 
defined. Usually, a price or cost variable c enters the indirect utility V and the negative of its coefficient 7 
βc is λ per definition (Train, 2003). The derived change in consumer surplus applies for a representative 8 
traveler. It can be interpreted as the average consumer surplus in the group under consideration. The 9 
change in total consumer surplus (sum over all travelers of the group) can then be calculated by 10 
multiplying the monetized logsum difference by total demand and it is: 11 
( )
1 0
ij ijV V
i j i jc
1
ΔE TCS = - ln e - ln e T
β
    
    
     
∑∑ ∑∑   (11) 12 
After this brief introduction of the logsum difference, we shall discuss the problem with applying it in the 13 
EVA MNL. The bases for changes in consumer surplus are project-induced changes of variables in the 14 
indirect utility function. If generalized costs decrease after intervention, indirect utility and consumer 15 
surplus increase. However, the EVA MNL comprises shadow prices as additional “bonus” components 16 
and shadow prices change as a consequence of changing costs. This means that if costs decrease, 17 
(positive) shadow prices also decrease. The question arises which consequence does it have? 18 
It can be shown (see Winkler, 2015) that it is: 19 
( )ij j i j-g +z +θ +τ
i j
T = e∑∑    (12) 20 
In the standard case T0 = T1 it follows: 21 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
ij j i j ij j i j-g +z +θ +τ -g +z +θ +τ
i j i j
1 0
ΔE U = ln e - ln e
= ln T - ln T
= 0
    
    
     
∑∑ ∑∑
  (13) 22 
From this it follows that, regardless of the changes of generalized costs, the logsum difference provides 23 
no (or incorrect) benefits. However, due to cost decreases, transport users in fact receive real benefit. 24 
Therefore, the logsum difference obviously fails for constrained models. 25 
There is only a little literature concerning this question. Williams (1976) and later Martinez and Araya 26 
(2000) showed approaches for deriving transport user benefit measure on the basis of doubly constrained 27 
gravity models. These derivations are based on the maximum entropy model and it is not easily 28 
transferable to other models. Furthermore, a rigorous relationship between the transport user benefit 29 
measure within the entropy framework and the logsum benefit measure within random utility theory has 30 
not been established so far (Geurs et al., 2010). Here we will close the gap and show a universal approach, 31 
which adjusts the logsum difference to multiple-constrained models. 32 
ADJUSTMENT OF THE LOGSUM DIFFERENCE 33 
We have shown that the logsum difference fails for the EVA MNL. For distinguishing the real change in 34 
expected maximum utility ( )UΔE  and the incorrect measure, we define the logsum difference applied to 35 
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the EVA MNL provides ( )E U*Δ  and it is ( ) ( )*E U E UΔ Δ≠ . In the following we want to clarify how the 1 
logsum difference should be adjusted to the EVA MNL. First of all, we derive the approach for the 2 
representative traveler. We then move over to the change in (total) consumer surplus. 3 
The starting point of the analysis is the differential: 4 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*1 *0 *
C
ΔE U = E U -E U = dE U* ∫    (14) 5 
where ( )*dE U  represents the demand function (Varian, 1992). Therefore it is: 6 
( ) ( )* ij ij
i j
dE U = P dV∑∑ V    (15) 7 
Here V is a vector of all alternative-specific deterministic utilities, since the probabilities depend on all 8 
alternatives. Hence it can be written: 9 
( ) ( )* ij ij
i jC
ΔE U = P dV∑∑∫ V    (16) 10 
This integral is a line integral and its solution depends on the path C between the final and initial state. 11 
Due to the fact that the antiderivative of the MNL, and hence of the EVA MNL, is known, a path 12 
independent solution of equation (16) is possible. However, as shown above, in the case of constraints the 13 
logsum difference does not provide the wanted change in expected maximum utility. For this reason a 14 
more detailed analysis including a segmentation of the EVA MNL is necessary. First of all the total 15 
differential dVijk can be expressed by partial differentials (Chiang and Wainwright, 2005): 16 
ij ij ij ij
ij ij j i j
ij j i j
V V V V
dV = - dg + dz + dθ + dτ
g z θ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   (17) 17 
All components are composed additive and without additional weightings. Hence, the figures of the 18 
partial derivatives equal one and it follows: 19 
ij ij j i jdV = -dg + dz + dθ + dτ    (18) 20 
For the sake of simplicity we define ( )ij ijP = PV  and it is: 21 
( ) ( )* ij ij j i j
i j
dE U = P -dg + dz + dθ + dτ∑∑    (19) 22 
Next we can insert it in equation (16) and obtain the integral with respect to the bounds of integration: 23 
( ) ( )
1
0
*
ij ij j i j
i j
ΔE U = P -dg + dz + dθ + dτ∑∑∫
V
V
   (20) 24 
Furthermore, a separation of the integral is necessary and possible (Merziger et al., 1999): 25 
( )
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
*
ij ij ij j ij i ij j
i j i j i j i j
ΔE U = - P dg + P dz + P dθ + P dτ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
g z θ τ
g z θ τ
  (21) 26 
( )*ΔE U  results from the sum of all integrals. For each integral the antiderivative is given by the logsum 27 
formulae. However, all integrals can only be solved one by one with respect to the considered changing 28 
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variable (g, z etc.) while all other components have to be constant. It has to be taken into account that 1 
benefit contributions of different variables depend on the sequence of integrations (path dependency). 2 
Hence, singly benefit contributions cannot be defined unambiguously, but the sum over all is independent. 3 
The requested change in expected maximum utility is only a function of real and observable changing 4 
attributes between the initial and final state (Williams, 1976). In the present analysis these are generalized 5 
costs g and destination utilities z and it is: 6 
( )
1 1
0 0
ij ij ij j
i j i j
ΔE U = - P dg + P dz∑∑ ∑∑∫ ∫
g z
g z
   (22) 7 
Now we can reformulate equation (21) and express ( )ΔE U  indirectly: 8 
( ) ( )
1 1
0 0
*
ij i ij j
i j i j
ΔE U = ΔE U - P dθ - P dτ∑∑ ∑∑∫ ∫
θ τ
θ τ
  (23) 9 
In this equation the logsum difference of the EVA MNL is adjusted by the shadow price integrals. 10 
However, again, their figures depend on sequence of calculation. Consequently the unambiguousness of 11 
the requested ( )ΔE U  depends on the solution of the integrals of shadow prices. These integrals are only 12 
one-dimensional because their differentials only have one dimension (I or j). Since a change in θi has no 13 
influence on probability of destination (same applies reciprocally for τi), it can be written: 14 
( ) ( )
1 1
0 0
*
i i j j
i j
ΔE U = ΔE U - P dθ - P dτ∑ ∑∫ ∫
θ τ
θ τ
  (24) 15 
where Pi, and Pj are the probabilities of choosing origin I and destination j. Hence, these probabilities 16 
represent representative traveler’s demand for origins and destinations. However, the demand functions 17 
for these probabilities are not explicitly defined, but result implicitly from the summation of alternative-18 
specific probabilities Pij. Consequently, antiderivatives do not exist and integration cannot readily be 19 
achieved, but it is necessary for deriving ( )ΔE U . 20 
For the solution of the integrals, it is of great importance whether the initial and final probabilities Pi and 21 
Pj are equal or not. Generally, they are equal in the case of inelastic and unequal in the case of elastic 22 
constraints. Next we shall derive the solution for the constant case through the example of 0 1i iP = P . 23 
Afterwards we turn to the elastic constraints ( 0 1j jP P≠ ). The following derivations are transferable one to 24 
one to other dimensions. 25 
Case 0 1i iP = P  26 
The probabilities are obviously constant and accordingly independent from shadow prices. Hence there 27 
are no formal interdependences of probabilities of the origins and the shadow prices. As a consequence, 28 
the probabilities can be taken outside the integrals. Thus, the integration is path-independent because of 29 
the independent integrability of all integration variables θi. So we obtain: 30 
1 1
0 0
θ
i i i i
i i θ
P dθ = P dθ⋅∑ ∑∫ ∫
θ
θ
   (25) 31 
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Then the integration of the differentials dθi provides the integration variables θi. Next we insert the 1 
bounds of integration and the solution for the inelastic constraint case is: 2 
( )
1
0
1 0
i i i i i
i i
P dθ = P θ -θ⋅∑ ∑∫
θ
θ
   (26) 3 
The probability for choosing origin i is defined by the ratio of total number of trips originating at zone i 4 
and total demand. These numbers are known from the trip generation and it can be written: 5 
( )
1
0
1 0i
i i i i
i i
OP dθ = θ -θ
T
⋅∑ ∑∫
θ
θ
   (27) 6 
This is an unambiguous solution and all relevant variables are given by the solved EVA MNL. 7 
Case 0 1j jP P≠  8 
If destination probabilities change between initial and final state, we need another approach, since we 9 
cannot take the probabilities outside the integral readily. So, in principal, it is necessary to integrate the 10 
(unknown) functions of the resulting probabilities Pjs. But we only have information about the Pjs for the 11 
two equilibrium (initial and final) states. Hence, we have to make an assumption about the shape of the 12 
function in between. According to the RoH we assume a linear form. 13 
With the assumption of a linear path of integration it can be written: 14 
1 1
0 0
τ0 1
j j
j j j
j j τ
P + P
P dτ = dτ
2
 
⋅  
 
∑ ∑∫ ∫
τ
τ
   (28) 15 
Now the integral can be solved analogically to the inelastic constraint case and we obtain: 16 
( )
1
0
0 1
j j 1 0
j j j j
j j
P + P
P dτ = τ - τ
2
 
⋅  
 
∑ ∑∫
τ
τ
   (29) 17 
Replacing probabilities by total numbers of trips gives: 18 
( )
1
0
0 1
j j 1 0
j j j j
j j
D + D1P dτ = τ - τ
2 T
 
⋅ ⋅  
 
∑ ∑∫
τ
τ
   (30) 19 
Again, all necessary variables are given by the EVA MNL. 20 
Now we are able to formulate the change in expected maximum utility of a representative traveler. For the 21 
example under consideration with one set of inelastic constraints for origins and one set of elastic 22 
constraints for destinations, we obtain: 23 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
ij j i j ij j i j-g +z +θ +τ -g +z +θ +τ
i j i j
0 1
j j0 1 0 1i
i i j j
i j
ΔE U = ln e - ln e
D + DO 1+ θ -θ + τ - τ
T 2 T
    
    
     
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
 
∑∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
  (31) 24 
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Obviously the logsum difference is corrected by the influence of the shadow prices. Furthermore, it is 1 
crucial to note that if shadow prices are unchanged, no correction is necessary. The last two terms cancel 2 
out and the logsum difference provides the change in consumer surplus. That is the case when generally 3 
no constraints occur or when constraints are only complied in the initial case. Then, in the final state 4 
initial shadow prices are considered as additional origin, destination or mode utilities. 5 
Finally, with ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0ij j i j ij j i j
i j i j
ln exp -g + z +θ + τ - ln exp -g + z +θ + τ = logDiff
   
   
   
∑∑ ∑∑  6 
equation (31) can be written as: 7 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
j j0 1 0 1i
i i j j
i j
D + DO 1
ΔE U = logDiff + θ -θ + τ - τ
T 2 T
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
 
∑ ∑   (32) 8 
Total change in consumer surplus 9 
So far, we have derived the change in expected maximum utility of a representative traveler. Now we 10 
move on to the solution for the needed (total) change in consumer surplus. For this purpose ( )ΔE U  has to 11 
be monetized by -βc (negative marginal utility of the cost variable) and multiplied by the total number of 12 
trips T. In case of T0 = T1, i.e. total demand is fixed and no project-induced new generated trips occur, we 13 
have: 14 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1 0 1i i i j j j j
i jc
1 1
ΔE TCS = - O θ -θ + D +D τ - τ
β 2
 
⋅ 
 
∑ ∑   (33) 15 
The logsum difference cancels out, since, as already partly shown in equation (13), it is: 16 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
ij j i j ij j i j
1
-g +z +θ +τ -g +z +θ +τ 1 0
0
i j i j
Tln e - ln e = ln T - ln T = ln
T
     
     
    
∑∑ ∑∑  (34) 17 
and log(1) = 0. Hence, the change in total consumer surplus results from the change in shadow prices. 18 
However, these changes are caused by changes of observable costs and (destination) utilities, therefore 19 
the project-induced transport user benefits are indirectly measured by this approach. If, for example, a 20 
cost reduction for trips originating in zone i occurs, this zone attains better accessibility. As a result of this, 21 
and under the assumption of respecting constraints, the shadow price of this zone decreases. Conversely, 22 
if shadow prices increase, negative benefits result. Hence, benefits changes are based on changes in 23 
accessibility of zones. 24 
It might be possible that a transport investment or policy leads to a change in the total number of trips and 25 
it is T0 ≠ T1. In this case an issue arises comparable to the shown changing probabilities of destinations. 26 
For calculating transport user benefits, we have to take into account the shape of the overall demand curve 27 
between T0 and T1, but we do not have information about that shape and only know total demand for the 28 
two equilibrium (initial and final) states. Hence, again, we have to make an assumption about it and use a 29 
linear form. Then, ( )ΔE U  (equation (32)) has to be multiplied by (T0 + T1) / 2 and it is: 30 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 10 10 1
j j0 1 0 1i i
i i j j
i jc
D + DO + O1 T + T 1
ΔE TCS = - logDiff + θ -θ + τ - τ
β 2 2 2 2
    
            
∑ ∑   (35) 31 
This equation provides the universal solution for calculating transport user benefits based on the MNL – 32 
with or without constraints. If no constraints and shadow prices occur, the logsum difference multiplied 33 
by the (mean) total demand provides the change in consumer surplus. The same applies to the constrained 34 
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case, if shadow prices are the same in the initial and final state. In these cases the last two terms on the 1 
right side cancel out. In contrast, if constraints are respected in both calculations, the derived adjustment 2 
of the logsum difference has to be taken into account. Then, under consideration of the mathematical 3 
simplification in equation (34), it can be written 4 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 10 11 0 1
j j0 1 0 1i i
i i j j0
i jc
D + DO + O1 T T + T 1
ΔE TCS = - ln + θ -θ + τ - τ
β T 2 2 2 2
     
              
∑ ∑   (36) 5 
If shadow prices of single dimensions (e.g., destinations) are equal in the initial and final state, the 6 
corresponding correction term disappears, while the others still apply. 7 
The meanings of the benefit terms in equation (35) are the same as explained for the case with fixed total 8 
demand. However, the first term enters as an additional benefit term that represents the positive benefits 9 
of new generated trips. Negative impacts of these additional trips (like competition for destinations) are 10 
taken into account by origin and destination specific shadow prices. That is, if new trips occur due to 11 
transport investment, shadow prices decrease less than without these additional trips. 12 
EXAMPLE 13 
The basic principle of the developed approach can be illustrated by a simple synthetic example, which is 14 
defined by 15 
• five travel zones 16 
• one homogenous group of persons 17 
• inelastic origin and destination constraints 18 
More realistic examples and case studies will be discussed in the future. However, a simple example such 19 
as this might be helpful for initial understanding. 20 
First of all we want to show the concept of calculation of travel demand by the EVA MNL. For this the 21 
costs of the initial and final state are summarized in TABLE 1. For the final state we suppose a reduction 22 
of costs for the relations from zone 1 to 4 and vice versa (marked in yellow). 23 
TABLE 1: Costs 24 
 25 
The result of the trip calculation (by equation (6)) for the initial state is shown in TABLE 2. In this 26 
example we consider inelastic constraints for origins and destinations and the resulting Ois and Djs equal 27 
the given Ois and Djs (constraints are satisfied). The total number of trips T (500 trips) is defined by the 28 
sum of the given Ois and Zjs, respectively. The shadow prices are derived from the iteratively calculated 29 
factors ai and bj (see, equation (7)). 30 
Trip distribution is analogously calculated for the final state and the results are also shown in TABLE 2. It 31 
is obvious that trips T14 and T41 have increased since the corresponding costs have decreased. The origin 32 
and destination constraints are again satisfied, but by new shadow prices. 33 
 34 
 35 
generalized costs [$] - initial state generalized costs [$] - final state
gij 1 2 3 4 5 gij 1 2 3 4 5
1 4,08 3,25 6,25 5,50 3,25 1 4,08 3,25 6,25 3,25 3,25
2 4,08 4,08 4,78 4,58 5,00 2 4,08 4,08 4,78 4,58 5,00
3 6,25 4,37 4,08 4,00 4,00 3 6,25 4,37 4,08 4,00 4,00
4 5,50 4,58 4,42 4,08 4,08 4 3,25 4,58 4,42 4,08 4,08
5 4,50 6,33 4,00 3,25 3,67 5 4,50 6,33 4,00 3,25 3,67
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 1 
TABLE 2: Resulting trips 2 
 3 
The results of the travel demand for the initial and final states are the base of the calculation of the change 4 
in consumer surplus. For applying the adjusted logsum difference (see, equation (36)), all Ois and Djs as 5 
well as all shadow prices are necessary. All other components in equation (36) cancel out. The result of 6 
the calculated change in consumer surplus is summarized in TABLE 3. It should be noted that decreasing 7 
shadow prices – and therefore a positive difference – induce positive benefits. 8 
A reduction of shadow prices is primary achieved for traffic zones that are directly affected by the cost 9 
changes (here: zones 1 and 4). The reason is that the accessibility of these zones has been improved and 10 
transport users need not be so “forced” to choose these zones (for satisfying constraints) by shadow prices. 11 
However, all constraints have to be satisfied in the final state, too. Therefore, all other zones are affected 12 
indirectly by the cost changes. Although their accessibilities have not changed, these zones loose 13 
attractiveness compared to zones 1 and 4 and shadow prices increase for satisfying constraints. 14 
The change in consumer surplus results from shadow price differences and the total numbers of trips, and 15 
it is calculated for each zone. However, it is important to note that only the sum over all zones is 16 
interpretable as the transport users benefit measure needed for evaluating transport investments by CBA, 17 
because the single values are only “proxies” for defining benefits of “real affected” transport users. The 18 
resulting change of consumer surplus for the example is $23.87.  19 
initial state
Tij 1 2 3 4 5 Oi-resulting Oi-given θ i
1 3.0 32.4 1.9 1.4 11.3 50 50 2.611
2 9.8 45.5 27.1 11.2 6.4 100 100 3.785
3 0.4 13.5 21.5 7.9 6.8 50 50 2.850
4 2.3 26.7 37.9 17.8 15.4 100 100 3.751
5 9.4 7.0 86.6 61.8 35.2 200 200 4.162
500 500 500
Dj-resulting 25 125 175 100 75 500
Dj-given 25 125 175 100 75 500
τj 2.581 4.116 4.299 3.211 3.065
final state
Tij 1 2 3 4 5 Oi-resulting Oi-given θ i
1 1.4 27.9 1.6 9.6 9.4 50 50 2.386
2 5.9 49.4 27.7 10.3 6.7 100 100 3.790
3 0.3 14.3 21.4 7.1 7.0 50 50 2.833
4 11.6 25.6 34.1 14.5 14.2 100 100 3.632
5 5.8 7.8 90.3 58.4 37.7 200 200 4.190
500 500 500
Dj-resulting 25 125 175 100 75 500
Dj-given 25 125 175 100 75 500
τj 2.068 4.194 4.313 3.128 3.107
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TABLE 3: Change in consumer surplus 1 
 2 
Now the result of the adjusted logsum difference approach should be compared with the widely used 3 
traditional RoH, whose applicability for travel demand models with constraints has recently been proved 4 
(Winkler, 2015). The RoH is an approximation of the user benefits and it depends on the change in costs 5 
and trips for each origin-destination-relation: 6 
( ) ( )( )0 1 0 1ij ij ij ij
i j
1
ΔE TCS = g -g T +T
2∑∑    (37) 7 
As we can see in equation (37) and TABLE 4, transport user benefits only occur for relations with 8 
changing costs. 9 
The comparison of the results shows that the approximate solution (RoH) overestimates the exact measure 10 
(adjusted logsum difference) with 17%. However, the difference between the RoH and an exact measure 11 
(logsum or adjusted logsum differences) can be positive or negative and it strongly depends on the 12 
amount of the cost changes and the shape of the underlying demand function (Ma et al., 2015). Therefore, 13 
it is recommended to use the exact measure for deriving transport user benefits. 14 
TABLE 4: Change in consumer surplus – calculated by the RoH 15 
 16 
∆CSi
[$]
O1 50 θ
O
1-θ
M
1 0,224 11,22
O2 100 θ
O
2-θ
M
2 -0,005 -0,49
O3 50 θ
O
3-θ
M
3 0,018 0,88
O4 100 θ
O
4-θ
M
4 0,120 11,96
O5 200 θ
O
5-θ
M
5 -0,027 -5,45
Σ(i) 18,11
∆CSj
[$]
D1 25 τ
O
1-τ
M
1 0,513 12,82
D2 125 τ
O
2-τ
M
2 -0,078 -9,69
D3 175 τ
O
3-τ
M
3 -0,014 -2,52
D4 100 τ
O
4-τ
M
4 0,083 8,34
D5 75 τ
O
5-τ
M
5 -0,042 -3,19
Σ(j) 5,76
Σ(i,j) 23,87
total number of trips 
originating at zone i
total number of trips 
attracted to zone j
difference of origin shadow 
prices
difference of destination 
shadow prices
∆gij 1 2 3 4 5 ΣTij/2 1 2 3 4 5
1 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,25 0,00 1 2,2 30,1 1,8 5,5 10,4
2 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2 7,9 47,5 27,4 10,8 6,5
3 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3 0,4 13,9 21,4 7,5 6,9
4 2,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4 6,9 26,1 36,0 16,2 14,8
5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5 7,6 7,4 88,5 60,1 36,4
∆CS 1 2 3 4 5
1 0,00 0,00 0,00 12,38 0,00
2 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
3 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
4 15,62 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
$ 28,00
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CONCLUSIONS 1 
In this paper we have seen – by the example of the EVA model – that multiple-constrained travel demand 2 
models are expressible in terms of a MNL. This is the basis for an economic analysis of these models and 3 
the starting point for the derivation of a transport user benefit measure that is usually needed for 4 
evaluating transport investments by CBA. For this purpose the change in consumer surplus is often used. 5 
This measure is provided by the MNL and called “logsum difference”, which is a very practical and 6 
mathematically exact approach. However, the logsum difference fails for travel demand models with 7 
constraints and only approximations can be used. 8 
For this reason we have derived an approach that adjusts the logsum difference for travel demand models 9 
with two sets of constraints. This approach provides the change in consumer surplus for models with 10 
different constraints (elastic and/or inelastic). Furthermore, it contains the logsum difference for the MNL 11 
without constraints as an exception. For the sake of clarity, the analyses presented have been focused on 12 
the case with inelastic constraints for the origin and elastic constraints for destination choice. Other cases 13 
can be analogically derived, but equation (35) provides the general solution for the change in consumer 14 
surplus that covers all possible combinations of constraints. 15 
The approach derived is suitable for measuring benefits caused by changing costs, but also for changing 16 
attractions. Attraction changes can be expressed by different origin or destination utilities or by a changed 17 
given total number of trips originating at or attracted to zones. Hence, it is possible to evaluate short-run 18 
and long-run impacts of transport investments and the derived approach can be used for a wide range of 19 
evaluations.  20 
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